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THE ROLE OF ARBITRABILITY IN
DISCIPLINARY DECISIONS IN
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
THOMAS A. BAKER, III*
&
DAN CONNAUGHTON**
I. INTRODUCTION
Power. Ultimately, arbitrability is about power. If a claim is arbitrable,
then the arbitrator has the power to hear and resolve the dispute rather than the
courts. In professional sports, arbitrability may even provide an arbitrator with
the power to trump decisions rendered by league commissioners. Such was the
case with the decision by a Grievance Arbitrator to reduce a penalty issued by
National Basketball Association (NBA) Commissioner David Stem against
Indiana Pacer Jermaine O'Neal. I The original penalty was a twenty-five game
suspension for striking a fan that the arbitrator reduced to fifteen games. 2
Stem and the NBA challenged the arbitrability of the suspensions in federal
court, and that case will serve as the backdrop for this article.
The suspension issued by Stem stemmed from a fight that broke out with
less than 45.9 seconds left in a nationally televised game between the Indiana
Pacers and the Detroit Pistons on November 19, 2004. 3 It was then that Pacer
forward Ron Artest committed a flagrant foul against Ben Wallace of the
Pistons, setting off a series of events that would ultimately lead to Artest
charging into the stands and attacking a fan.4 A melee ensued that pitted
several Pacer players against Pistons and Piston fans. During the fight, Pacer
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School of Law; Instructor at the University of Florida in Legal Issues in Sport.
*" B.S. in Exercise and Sport Sciences; M.S. in Recreational Studies, the University of Florida;
M.S. in Physical Education (Administration), Bridgewater State College; Doctorate in Sport
Administration, the Florida State University; Associate Professor in Sport Law and Risk
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1. See Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Nat'l Basketball Players Ass'n, No. 04 Civ. 9528, 2005 WL
22869 (S.D.N.Y Jan. 3, 2005).
2. Id. at *3.
3. Id. at*1.
4. Id.
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forward O'Neal confronted and struck a spectator on the playing floor.5
Television cameras captured the entire incident. The fight would go down as
one of the darkest moments in the history of the NBA.
Wasting no time, Stem sanctioned participating players just two days after
the fight.6 The punishments were some of the most severe in the history of the
NBA. In total, nine different players were suspended from playing in an
aggregate of 140 games. 7 Pacers Ron Artest, Stephen Jackson, and Jermaine
O'Neal received the most severe punishments. Artest was suspended for the
remainder of the season while Jackson and O'Neal received thirty and twenty-
five game suspensions respectively. 8
The National Basketball Players Association (NBPA) appealed the
suspensions to the Grievance Arbitrator pursuant to Article XXXI of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), claiming that the suspensions were
"inconsistent with the terms of the CBA and applicable law, and without just
cause." 9 The NBA countered by arguing that any appeal from disciplinary
rulings is solely within the Commissioner's purview. 10
"On December 3, 2004, the Grievance Arbitrator issued an initial decision
that he 'had jurisdiction to determine the arbitrability of [the] grievance' and
urged the NBA to attend a hearing scheduled for December 9, 2004.11 The
hearing was conducted and the Grievance Arbitrator upheld all the
suspensions except O'Neal's, whose suspension was reduced by ten games for
lack of cause. 12
The NBA filed for a declaratory judgment from the Circuit Court for the
Southern District of New York, asking the court to declare that the Arbitrator
had no jurisdiction to hear the dispute. 13 The NBPA answered by asking the
court to confirm the Arbitrator's award. 14 The court agreed with the NBPA
and the Grievance Arbitrator in finding that the suspension was an arbitrable
dispute and denied the NBA's motion to vacate while confirming the
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Suspensions Without Pay, Won't be Staggered, ESPN.COM, Nov. 21, 2004,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=1928540.
8. Id.
9. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 2005 WL 22869, at * 1.
10. Id. at *2.
11. Id. at *3.
12. Id. at *4.
13. Id. at *1.
14. Id.
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Arbitration Award that reduced O'Neal's suspension.15
The question of how the court determined that the matter was arbitrable
will be the focus of this article. In answering this question, this article will
analyze First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,16 Howsam v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc.,17 and Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 18 the three most
recent and significant decisions on arbitrability from the United States
Supreme Court. Through these cases the Court provides a roadmap for
resolving arbitrability issues. Thus, it is important to analyze these cases and
determine how closely the district court followed the Supreme Court's
roadmap in its holding that the suspension of NBA players by the
Commissioner is an arbitrable issue.
II. FIRST OPTIONS OF CHICAGO, INC. V. KAPLAN
Perhaps the most critical issue in an arbitrability dispute involves the
question of "who decides arbitrability." The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),
passed by Congress in 1925, provides a general answer to this question with
its rule that courts are to decide arbitrability. 19 There are, however, exceptions
to this general rule. One such exception lies in the fact that the FAA's rules
are default rules, meaning that the parties are free to deviate from these rules
through express contractual agreement. 20 The U.S. Supreme Court explained
this concept in First Options, when it stated, "the question 'who has the
primary power to decide arbitrability' turns on what the parties agreed about
[the] matter. Did the parties agree to submit the arbitrability question itself to
arbitration?,21
The Court in First Options also provided guidance for determining
whether the parties actually agreed to submit the issue of arbitrability to
arbitration. 22 Thus, further discussion of this case is warranted. The lawsuit
in First Options arose out of a dispute for a debt allegedly owed as a result of
the 1987 stock market crash.23 Manual and Carol Kaplan were owners of a
business, MK Investments, Inc. (MK), through which Manual Kaplan worked
15. Id. at *10.
16. 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
17. 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
18. 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
19. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4 (2000).
20. First Options, 514 U.S. at 943.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 940.
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as a stock trader.24 First Options acted as a "clearing firm" that handled
MKI's trades on the floor at the Philadelphia Stock Exchange. 25 When the
stock market crashed in October of 1987, MKI left a deficit of $2.1 million in
First Options' account. 26
The parties attempted to resolve the matter through a "work-out"
agreement; however, First Options ultimately submitted the dispute to
arbitration pursuant to a broad arbitration agreement contained in one of the
four documents that embodied said work-out agreement. 27 MKI agreed to
arbitration, but the Kaplans did not.28 An arbitration panel found in favor of
First Options and awarded damages in its favor in excess of $6 million. 29 The
Kaplans filed a petition to vacate the award in federal court under section 10
of the FAA, but the district court rejected the Kaplan's claim and confirmed
First Options' award. 30 On appeal, the Third Circuit agreed with the Kaplans
that their dispute was not arbitrable and reversed the district court's ruling as
to the Kaplans. 31 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
answer the question of who had the power to decide whether the dispute was
arbitrable. 32
Justice Breyer, writing on behalf of the unanimous Court, stated that "the
answer to the 'who' question ... was fairly simple." 33 The Court only needed
to look to the parties' agreement and determine how they agreed to resolve the
question. 34 Thus, the answer to the "who" question by the Court would turn
on whether the broad arbitration clause found in the work-out agreement
provided an express agreement to arbitrate arbitrability. 35
In making this determination, the Court recognized that it should "apply
ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts." 36 The
relevant state law in this case required "the court to see whether the parties
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.; Richard C. Reuben, First Options, Consent to Arbitration and the Demise of Separability:
Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration Provisions, 56 SMU L. REv. 819, 855
(2003).
27. First Options, 514 U.S. at 941.
28. Id.
29. Id., Reuben, supra note 26, at 856.
30. First Options, 514 U.S. at 941.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 943.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 944.
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objectively revealed intent to submit the question" of arbitrability to
arbitration. 37 However, the Court also recognized that it had added an
important qualification for determining when courts should decide whether the
parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability: "[c]ourts should not assume that the
parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is 'clea[r] and
unmistakabl[e]' evidence that they did so."'38 Thus, courts should decide
arbitrability when the parties are silent or the agreement is ambiguous on the
subject.39 This ruling did not create any new rule of law, but its application
reverses an existing presumption of arbitrability for "who decides
arbitrability" disputes.40
In this regard, the Court recognized that it was distinguishing the "who
decides arbitrability" decision from questions concerning the scope of a valid
arbitration agreement. 41 As this article will discuss further in Section II, there
is a presumption of arbitrability for questions concerning the scope of a valid
arbitration agreement. 42 The Court justified the difference in treatment for the
two questions on the fact that for scope of arbitration questions, the parties
have at least agreed to arbitrate some issues.43 Thus, the law may be more
permissive towards allowing arbitration.44 Conversely, the Court found that
questions of "who decides arbitrability" are arcane. 45 Therefore, the Court
stated that the law must be less permissive for these questions because a party
should only have to arbitrate those issues that it has specifically agreed to
arbitrate. 46 Accordingly, the Court understood why courts may hesitate to
interpret silence or ambiguity for "who decides arbitrability" questions in
favor of arbitrability because this might force unwilling parties to arbitrate
matters that they reasonably thought a judge would decide. 47 Requiring clear
and unmistakable evidence that parties want to submit arbitrability disputes to
arbitration also adheres to the FAA's default rule that courts should decide
arbitrability. 48
37. Id.
38. Id. (citing AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)).
39. Id.
40. Reuben, supra note 26, at 857.
41. First Options, 514 U.S. at 944.
42. Id. at 945. See also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
626 (1985).
43. First Options, 514 U.S. at 945.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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Applying this requirement to the facts, the Court found that First Options
could not show that the Kaplans clearly agreed to arbitrate arbitrability. 49 First
Options relied on the Kaplans' filing a written memorandum objecting to the
arbitrator's jurisdiction as proof that the Kaplans were willing to arbitrate that
issue.50 The Court dismissed this claim because the Kaplans were forcefully
objecting to the arbitrator's deciding their dispute.51 Further, Third Circuit
law suggested that parties might be free to argue arbitrability before an
arbitrator without giving up their right to judicial review. 52 Second, First
Options tried to persuade the court with arguments based on efficiency and
FAA policy. 53 Specifically, First Options argued that permitting the parties to
argue arbitrability to an arbitrator without being bound would cause "waste in
the resolution of disputes" and that the FAA, therefore, required a presumption
that the Kaplans be bound by the arbitrator's decision. 54 The Court dismissed
these arguments as inconclusive and legally erroneous. 55
The Court could not find a strong arbitration-related policy favoring First
Options within the FAA. 56 In fact, such a finding would run counter to the
FAA's default rule that the courts are to decide arbitrability absent an express
agreement to the contrary. Also, the Court found that there is no inconclusive
proof that allowing arbitrators to rule on arbitrability would slow down the
dispute resolution process. 57 Even if such allowance did result in a quicker
resolution, the Court stated that the basic objective in this area is not to resolve
disputes in the quickest manner possible regardless of the parties' wishes. 58
Accordingly, the Court upheld the Third Circuit's decision to reverse the
arbitrable award against the Kaplans because the parties did not clearly agree
to arbitrate arbitrability. 59
Through its decision in First Options, the Court has moved toward an
expectation model based on actual consent. Specifically, the Court appears to
be focusing on what the parties expected through requiring evidence that the
parties actually consented to arbitrate arbitrability. The concept of requiring
49. Id. at 946.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 947.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 949.
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actual consent is supported by a line of cases beginning with United
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. 60 where the Court
upheld an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement. 61 The Court
found that arbitration is a creature of contract and parties cannot be forced to
arbitrate those disputes that they have not agreed to arbitrate.62 Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co. is actually one of three cases involving the United
Steelworks of America, and the Court upheld arbitration agreements in the
collective bargaining process in each decision.63 This trilogy of cases is often
cited for the creation of a presumption of arbitrability for enforcing arbitration
agreements found in collective bargaining agreements. 64 Although Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co. set the rule that parties must agree to arbitrate
arbitrability, the Court expanded this rule with its decision in AT&T
Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America65 by holding that
the question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is undeniably a question
for judicial determination unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide
otherwise. 66
Thus, First Options both affirms and extends the "clear and unmistakable"
requirement for agreements to arbitrate arbitrability. 67  It affirms the
requirement in the collective bargaining context and it extends it to private
contractual contexts. 68 However, at least two circuits have declined to extend
First Options to the collective bargaining context.69 These circuits recognize
the "clear and unmistakable" requirement but are more willing to find such an
agreement in a collective bargaining contract because, "unlike parties in the
commercial arbitration context, parties entering into a collective bargaining
agreement know they are granting the arbitrator tremendous power to define
and 'fill in the gaps' of their agreement.",70 Thus, some courts will find "clear
and unmistakable" evidence that the parties wish to arbitrate arbitrability in
broad and sweeping arbitration clauses, if the clauses are found in a collective
60. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
61. Id. at 585.
62. Id. at 584.
63. See United Steelworkers of Aim. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers
of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
64. Reuben, supra note 26, at 861.
65. 475 U.S. 643 (1986).
66. Id. at 649.
67. Reuben, supra note 26, at 861.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Desert Palace, Inc., 94 F.3d 1308, 1311 (9th Cir.
1996); Abram Landau Real Estate v. Benova, 123 F.3d 69, 70 (2d Cir. 1997).
70. UnitedBhd., 94 F.3d at 1311.
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bargaining agreement. 71 Additionally, a number of courts have found "clear
and unmistakable" evidence in arbitration agreements that incorporate or adopt
by reference the rules of arbitration associations that include provisions stating
that the arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction.72
III. HOWSAM V. DEAN WITER REYNOLDS, INC.
In 2002, the Court built upon its holding in First Options by providing
further clarification as to who should decide arbitrability with its decision in
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.73 The controversy in Howsam arose
out of investment advice that Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. (Dean Witter)
provided Karen Howsam sometime between 1986 and 1994.74  Howsam
alleged that Dean Witter misrepresented the "virtues of the partnership" in a
submission for arbitration before the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD).75 This submission was pursuant to a broad arbitration clause
found within the Client Service Agreement between Howsam and Dean
Witter.76 The Client Service Agreement also provided that Howsam could
select the arbitration forum.77 Accordingly, Howsam selected the NASD. 78
Unfortunately for Howsam, the NASD had an arbitration rule that
prohibited arbitration for any claim "where six (6) years have elapsed from the
occurrence or event giving rise to the . . . dispute." 79 Dean Witter filed a
lawsuit in federal district court asking the court to declare that the "dispute
was 'ineligible for arbitration' because it was more than six years old." 80
Dean Witter also wanted the court to issue an injunction prohibiting Howsam
71. Id. But see Roubik v. Merrill, Lynch Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 692 N.E.2d 1167, 1173
(Ill. 1998) (holding that a broad arbitration clause was silent on the issue of who should decide
arbitrability); Riley Mfg. Co. v. Anchor Glass Container Corp., 157 F.3d 775, 780-81 (10th Cir. 1998)
(holding that broad arbitration clauses lack the specific authorization for arbitrating arbitrability).
72. Mark Berger, Arbitration and Arbitrability: Toward an Expectation Model, 56 BAYLOR L.
REV. 753, 754 (2004). See, e.g., Johnson v. Polaris Sales, Inc, 257 F. Supp. 2d 300, 308-09 (D.Me.
2003); Brandon, Jones, Sandall, Zeide, Kohn, Chalal & Musso, P.A. v. MedPartners, Inc., 203 F.R.D.
677, 684 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Brake Masters Sys., Inc. v. Gabbay, 78 P.3d 1081, 1084-85 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2003).
73. 537 U.S. 79 (2002); Reuben, supra note 26, at 862.
74. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 81.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 82.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 81 (quoting NAT'L ASW'N OF SEC. DEALERS, NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION
PROCEDURE § 10304 (1984)).
80. Id. at 82.
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from seeking further arbitration. 81 The district court dismissed Dean Witter's
claim on the basis that the NASD arbitrator, rather than the court, should
interpret and apply NASD rules.82 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the
district court's decision on the grounds that the application of the NASD rule
presented a question of the underlying disputes arbitrability. 83 In its decision,
the Tenth Circuit relied heavily on the presumption affirmed in First Options
that a court, not an arbitrator, will ordinarily decide an arbitrability question.84
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari because the federal
circuits were split as to whether a court or an arbitrator should interpret and
apply the NASD rule. 85
In particular, the circuits were split into two camps. One division was of
the belief that the six-year rule was analogous to a statute of limitations, thus a
procedural matter that should be left to the arbitrator. 86 The second grouping
of circuits believed that the rule was a substantive jurisdictional requirement
that needed judicial resolution. 87 This division provides a perfect example of
how courts use the doctrines of procedural and substantive arbitrability to
resolve the "who decides arbitrability" question.
Substantive arbitrability involves the substantive merits of whether the
parties actually agreed to arbitrate the dispute. Thus, substantive arbitrability
involves jurisdictional questions that must be answered by courts because
courts, and not arbitrators, must decide whether matters are arbitrable. 88
However, not every gateway question involves the substantive merits of the
dispute.89
In fact, some gateway questions are more procedural in nature.90 These
questions involve conditions that must be satisfied before there is a duty to
arbitrate. 9' Such conditions precedent might include issues involving notice,
waiver, and estoppel. 92 The doctrine of procedural arbitrability dictates that
the arbitrator instead of the court must answer questions over mere procedural
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 261 F.3d 956, 970 (10th Cir. 2001).
84. Id. at 968-69.
85. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83.
86. Reuben, supra note 26, at 863.
87. Id.
88. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4.
89. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83.
90. Id.
91. Reuben, supra note 26, at 836.
92. Id.
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matters.93 This rule serves to reduce the possibility of delay and the costs
associated with such delay that results when courts, rather than arbitrators,
have to answer technical questions.94
Unfortunately, little consistency could be found in the case law that relied
on the doctrines of substantive and procedural arbitrability in resolving the
"who decides arbitrability" question. 95 Using these doctrines, different courts
could reach different opinions as to whether arbitrability disputes were
substantive or procedural. In fact, the split in the circuits over the time limit
requirement raised in Howsam provided a demonstration of the inconsistency
resulting from application of the doctrines.96 Additionally, there was even
some debate as to the continued existence of the doctrine of procedural
arbitrability in light of the Court's refashioned method for answering the "who
decides arbitrability" question in First Options.97 The Court settled that
debate with its decision in Howsam.
In Howsam, the Court recognized that, "'procedural questions which grow
out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition' are presumptively not for
the judge, but for an arbitrator, to decide." 98 However, the Court stated that
these gateway procedural disputes are not "questions of arbitrability." 99
Accordingly, "the strong pro-court presumption as to the parties' likely intent
does not apply" to these disputes. 100 The Court held that the NASD time limit
rule fell within the class of procedural questions that should be resolved by the
arbitrator.' 10
Dean Witter argued that even without the pro-court presumption, the
contract calls for judicial determination because it incorporated the NASD's
time limit rule that used the word "eligible." 10 2 In Dean Witter's opinion, the
word "eligible" indicated the parties' intent for the time limit rule to be
answered by a court before arbitration. 10 3 The Court disagreed with Dean
Witter's interpretation of the contract. 104 In fact, the Court found that parties
93. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557-59 (1964).
94. Id. at 558.
95. Reuben, supra note 26, at 836.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 862.
98. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84 (quoting John Wiley & Sons, 376 U.S. at 557) (emphasis in
original).
99. Id. at 85.
100. Id. at 86.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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to an arbitration agreement would likely expect "a forum-based decisionmaker
to decide forum-specific procedural gateway matters." 10 5 Further, the Court
found that the weight placed by Dean Witter on the word "eligible" was
counterbalanced by the other NASD rules incorporated into the contract
providing that "'arbitrators shall be empowered to interpret and determine the
applicability [of the NASD Code.]"1 0 6
The Court also recognized that NASD arbitrators are comparatively more
knowledgeable in the procedures applicable to the arbitration process and are
more expert in understanding NASD's arbitration rules. 107 Thus, the Court
found that, in the absence of any statement to the contrary, it is more
reasonable to infer that the parties expected the arbitrator to resolve these
technical issues.10 8 Additionally, the Court recognized that a law that assumes
"an expectation that aligns (1) the decision maker with (2) comparative
expertise will better help secure a fair and expeditious resolution of the
underlying controversy."' 0 9 Consequently, the Court in Howsam believed that
it had reached a decision that reflected the expectation of the parties, thus
continuing its movement toward an expectation model for resolving
arbitrability disputes.
IV. GREEN TREE FINANCIAL CORP. V. BAZZLE
In Howsam, the Court distinguished gateway procedural questions from
gateway arbitrability questions. 10 In doing so, the Court held that the "strong
pro-court presumption as to the parties' likely intent" was not applicable to
gateway procedural issues.Il' Instead, the Court aligned gateway procedural
questions with questions as to the scope of a valid arbitration agreement. 112
For these questions, there is a presumption for arbitrability. 113 This rule holds
true whether the issue involves construction of contract language or
allegations of a defense to arbitrability. 114 However, the presumption is a
default rule and is thus subject to modification by agreement between the
105. Id.
106. Id. (quoting NAT'L ASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE §
10304 (1984)).
107. Id. at 85.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 84.
113. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
114. Id.
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parties.115
In 2003, the United States Supreme Court in Green Tree Financial Corp.
v. Bazzle1 16 used the pro-arbitration presumption to find that arbitrators, and
not the court, should decide whether class action arbitration is allowed under
arbitration association rules. 117 The ruling in Green Tree Financial Corp. may
not be as significant as the guidance provided by the Court as to how it applies
the presumption of arbitrability to the scope of arbitration issues and how it
distinguishes the scope of arbitration issues from gateway arbitrability issues.
The conflict in Green Tree Financial Corp. involved a contract between a
commercial lender and its customers that contained a broad arbitration clause
that called for arbitration of all contract-related disputes. 118 Green Tree
Financial Corp. actually consisted of two different cases that were brought
against Green Tree Financial Corporation (Green Tree), each based on the
same contract. 119 Further, both cases alleged that Green Tree was not
compliant with South Carolina banking laws. 120
Green Tree won motions to compel arbitration in each case. 121 However,
Green Tree's victories proved hollow because both sets of plaintiffs were
granted class action certification 122 and both arbitration proceedings resulted
in awards for the plaintiffs. 123 In fact, the same arbitrator heard both cases and
awarded the first class, represented by Lynn and Burt Bazzle, $10,935,000 in
damages, and awarded the second class, represented by Daniel Lackey and
George and Florine Buggs, $9,200,000 in damages. 124 Green Tree appealed
both decisions in South Carolina state court on the grounds that class action
arbitration was legally impermissible. 125
Ultimately, the cases reached the South Carolina Supreme Court where the
two proceedings were consolidated and their awards were affirmed.126 In
affirming the arbitration awards, the court held that even though the contracts
did not speak to the validity of class action arbitration, such proceedings were
115. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 376 U.S. at 558.
116. 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
117. Id. at 454.
118. Id. at 447.
119. Id. at 448.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 449.
122. The first class was certified by the district court while an arbitrator certified the second
class. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 450.
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consistent with South Carolina law. 127 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to decide whether the South Carolina Supreme Court's
ruling was consistent with the FAA. 1
28
The author of the Court's decisions in First Options and Howsam, Justice
Breyer, delivered the opinion in Green Tree Financial Corp., further
distinguishing himself as the Court's leading authority on arbitration. Unlike
the other two cases, Green Tree Financial Corp. was not a unanimous
decision. Justices Scalia, Souter and Ginsberg joined Justice Breyer in the
opinion, 129 but Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy and Thomas
dissented. 130 Justice Stevens dissented in part but concurred in the judgment
to give it controlling authority as a plurality decision. 13 1
A. The Plurality's Decision
In the plurality opinion, Justice Breyer treated the case as one of contract
interpretation. 132 Thus, its resolution hinged on whether the scope of the
arbitration agreement covered class arbitration. 133 The Court looked to the
agreement and found that the parties agreed to arbitrate "[a]ll disputes, claims,
or controversies arising from or relating to this contract or the relationships
which result from this contract."' 134 While these broad terms did not literally
answer the question as to whether class arbitration was allowed, the Court did
find that the "sweeping" language provided evidence that the parties intended
for an arbitrator to decide the issue and not the courts. 135
Although, even if the broad language of the arbitration agreement left
room for doubt, the Court found that such doubt had to be resolved through
application of the presumption of arbitrability. 136 After all, the presumption
applies whenever a dispute concerns the scope of a valid arbitration
agreement. 13 Accordingly, the pro-arbitration presumption applied in Green
Tree Financial Corp. because the Court found that the dispute tested the scope
of a valid arbitration agreement, particularly, whether the agreement allowed
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 447.
130. Id. at 455,460
131. Id. at 454.
132. Id. at451.
133. Id.
134. Id. (emphasis in original).
135. Id. at453.
136. Id. at 452.
137. Id. at 452 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 626).
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for class arbitration. 138
The Court could have easily ended its discussion on the applicability of
the pro-arbitration presumption once it determined that the dispute was one of
contract interpretation. Instead, the Court went much further in its application
of the presumption of arbitrability by recognizing only two exceptions to its
application. 139 According to the Court, these exceptions are based on the
assumption that parties intend for particular matters to be resolved by courts
and not arbitrators. 140 The two exceptions recognized by the Court arise when
the courts must answer the gateway questions of (1) whether the parties have a
valid arbitration agreement, and (2) whether the arbitration agreement applies
to the controversy. 41
For these "limited" circumstances, a pro-court presumption applies "in the
absence of 'clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]' evidence to the contrary."' 142 If the
controversy does not concern one of these two questions, then the presumption
of arbitrability controls. 143 Thus, by limiting the application of the pro-court
presumption to only two gateway questions of arbitrability, the Court greatly
extended the presumption of arbitrability's coverage.144
Applying this approach to the facts in Green Tree Financial Corp., the
Court concluded that the question of whether class arbitration could take place
involved "neither the validity of the arbitration clause nor its applicability to
the underlying dispute .. ..*"145 Therefore, the question did not fall within the
limited set of circumstances included in the exception to the presumption of
arbitration. 146 Consequently, the Court held that an arbitrator should resolve
the dispute based on both the presumption of arbitration and the broad
arbitration clause that evidenced the parties' intent for an arbitrator to resolve
the question. 147 Based on this determination, the plurality vacated the decision
of the South Carolina Supreme Court and remanded the case to arbitration.
148
138. Id.
139. Id. at 452.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. (citing AT&T Techs. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 454.
148. Id.
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B. Justice Stevens's Concurrence in Part and Dissent in Part
Justice Stevens concurred with the majority's opinion on the validity of
class arbitration, but he dissented on how the Court reached that decision.
14 9
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens emphasized that the parties agreed
that South Carolina law governed their arbitration agreement. 150 He then
recognized that South Carolina law permitted class arbitration as long as the
procedure was not prohibited by the applicable arbitration agreement.
51
Further, FAA did not preclude class arbitration.' 52 Thus, Justice Stevens
agreed that class arbitration should be allowed, but took issue with the fact that
the courts were resolving this dispute rather than the arbitrator. 53 However,
because he agreed with the ultimate decision, he would not prevent that
decision from having the force of law merely because he believed that the
wrong decision maker made it.
1 54
C. The Rehnquist Dissent
Chief Justice Rehnquist penned the first dissent and was joined by Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy.' 5 5 These three were of the opinion that the question
as to whether class action arbitration should be allowed was one for the courts
to decide.' 56  Further, they believed that the wording of the arbitration
agreement at issue in Green Tree Financial Corp. prohibited class
arbitration.' 57
In the dissent, the Chief Justice did acknowledge that the court must pay
considerable deference to decisions rendered by arbitrators. 158 But he also
recognized that the deference owed is limited to only those matters that the
parties agreed to arbitrate. 159 In deciding that the validity of class arbitration
was not a matter that the parties agreed to arbitrate, Chief Justice Rehnquist
aligned the facts in Green Tree Financial Corp. with those found in First
149. Id. at 455.
150. Id. at 454.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 454-55.
153. Id. at 455.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 456 (citing Major League Baseball Players Ass'n. v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504 (2001)).
159. Id. (quoting First Options, 514 U.S. at 945).
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Options rather than those found in Howsam. 160
Particularly, the Chief Justice believed that First Options controlled the
case rather than Howsam because the validity of class arbitration is more akin
to the issue of what shall be arbitrated than it is those procedural questions that
Howsam says should be resolved by the arbitrator.161 The Chief Justice found
that the procedural matters left for arbitration in Howsam involved
prerequisites to arbitration like waiver, delay, or other similar defenses to
arbitration. 162  Chief Justice Rehnquist believed that the allowance or
probation of class arbitration did not fall within one of the aforementioned
gateway prerequisites to arbitration; instead, the question was fundamental to
the agreement. 163
Central to this finding was the fact that class arbitration involves one
arbitrator for all claims included in the class. 164 However, the Chief Justice
interpreted the arbitration agreement at issue to provide Green Tree with the
contractual right to select an arbitrator for each dispute. 165 The basis for this
interpretation was the fact that the arbitration agreement used singular nouns.
Specifically, the contract called for the selection of an arbitrator "by us,"
meaning Green Tree, with the consent of "you," meaning the plaintiff, for
disputes resulting from "this" contract. 166 The Chief Justice stated that the use
of these singular nouns, "make quite clear that petitioner must select, and each
buyer must agree to, a particular arbitrator for disputes between petitioner and
that specific buyer."'167
Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist found that arbitrating the claims as a class
with only one arbitrator would result in Green Tree Financial being stripped of
its contractual right to select an arbitrator for the remaining 3734 disputes. 168
The right to choose an arbitrator, in the Chief Justice's opinion, was just as
fundamental to the agreement as the question of what matters are to be
submitted to arbitration. 169 Accordingly, the Chief Justice reasoned that the
parties must have intended for the court, instead of the arbitrator, to determine
160. Id. at 457.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 459.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 456.
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whether class arbitration was allowed. 170 Interpreting the issue any other way,
in the Chief Justice's judgment, could result in unwilling parties arbitrating
matters that they never agreed to arbitrate. 171
D. Justice Thomas's Dissent
Justice Thomas dissented based on his belief that the FAA does not apply
to state court proceedings. 172 Therefore, the FAA could not provide grounds
for pre-empting the South Carolina Supreme Court's interpretation of a private
arbitration agreement.173
E. Reconciling Green Tree Financial Corp.: Comparing the Plurality and the
Rehnquist Dissent
At first blush, it may seem alarming that the same Court that unanimously
decided First Options and Howsam could be so divided in Green Tree
Financial Corp., especially considering that in Green Tree Financial Corp.
both the plurality and the Rehnquist dissent used the same case law, First
Options and Howsam, in reaching different conclusions. So exactly why was
the Court so divided? Ultimately, contract interpretation and characterization
are what separated the plurality from the Rehnquist dissenters in Green Tree
Financial Corp.
The plurality interpreted the broad arbitration clause to include all issues
related to the loan, including whether disputes relating to the loan can be
handled through class arbitration. 174 Thus, to the plurality, the case fell more
in line with the Court's decision in Howsam because the legitimacy of class
arbitration was a procedural issue rather than a gateway arbitrability issue. 175
After all, the parties were not disputing the validity of the arbitration clause or
whether the arbitration clause covered the underlying loan dispute. Instead, to
the plurality, the only question really at issue was whether the parties could
procedurally arbitrate as a class. 176
The Chief Justice, however, was not willing to characterize the dispute as
a matter related to the loan and was unwilling to interpret the contract to
require arbitration. To Chief Justice Rehnquist, it was not accurate to
170. Id.
171. Id. (quoting First Options, 514 U.S. at 945).
172. Id. at 460.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 451.
175. Id. at 453.
176. Id. at 452
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characterize the question as one dealing with the appropriateness of class
arbitration for the underlying loan dispute. 177 Rather, to the Chief Justice, the
question hinged on the appropriateness of arbitration for a class action
dispute.178 Therefore, the issue involved a gateway arbitrability question, thus
making it more akin to the question presented in First Options.179
Further, the Chief Justice was unwilling to interpret the broad arbitration
clause to cover the question of whether class arbitration was permissible. 180
Conversely, he interpreted the singular tense used in the broad arbitration
clause to suggest that the parties did not agree to arbitrate the dispute. 181 In
effect, Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent could be read to conclude that a
broadly phrased arbitration clause is not enough to satisfy the "clear and
unmistakable" evidence standard needed to overcome the pro-court
presumption applicable to gateway arbitrability disputes.182
A close look at the plurality and the Rehnquist dissent reveals that these
divided factions did not disagree on the applicable law. Instead, the two sides
were split on how the law should be applied to the dispute at issue, the validity
of class arbitration. Based on this split, the implications of Green Tree
Financial Corp. remain unclear. It is possible that the case represents a
division amongst the Justices as to how the Court should distinguish gateway
procedural disputes from gateway arbitrable disputes. However, it is also
possible that the Court may only be divided on the specific issue of whether
class action arbitration should be permitted. Needless to say, it will be
interesting to see where the Court goes from here. However, even though the
decision in Green Tree Financial Corp. was not unanimous, thanks to Justice
Stevens's concurrence, the case is controlling on all lower courts. Further, the
Court in Green Tree Financial Corp. did reinforce and clarify the process
outlined in First Options and Howsam for resolving arbitrability disputes.
Thus, these cases do provide assistance to courts for the resolution of
arbitrability questions.
V. THE ARBITRABILITY ROADMAP ESTABLISHED BY FIRST OPTIoNS, HOWSAM
AND GREEN TREE FINANCIAL CORP.
Through its decisions in First Options, Howsam, and Green Tree
177. Id. at 457.
178. Id. See also Kristen M. Blankley, Arbitrability After Green Tree v. Bazzle: Is There
Anything Left For The Courts, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 697, 704-05 (2004).
179. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 539 U.S. at 457.
180. Id. at 458-59.
181. Id. at 459.
182. Berger, supra note 72, at 799.
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Financial Corp., the Supreme Court sought to provide guidance for lower
courts and to get the circuit courts on the same page in terms of how they
resolve arbitrability disputes. Again, the first two cases, First Options and
Howsam, were unanimously decided and strongly demonstrated the Court's
intent to move toward a method for deciding arbitrability based on the parties'
expectations, as evidenced through actual consent. Then came the plurality
decision in Green Tree Financial Corp. The plurality in Green Tree Financial
Corp. did continue to emphasize the role of party expectation by recognizing
that parties expect certain matters to be heard by judges while expecting that
arbitrators would hear other matters. 183 However, it could be argued that the
Court in Green Tree Financial Corp. de-emphasized the role of actual consent
in determining party expectation by drastically expanding what parties
''expect" to be heard by arbitrators.
With that said, the decisions in First Options, Howsam, and Green Tree
Financial Corp. can be read to form a roadmap for courts to follow when
confronted with questions as to whether a judge or arbitrator should resolve a
dispute. The first step in the roadmap requires the court to determine whether
the parties have expressly answered the question through their arbitration
agreement. Based on the decision in Green Tree Financial Corp., if the
agreement is silent as to who should decide the particular problem at issue but
the parties use a broad arbitration agreement, then it is likely that they have
agreed that an arbitrator will answer the relevant question. 1 84
The next step in the roadmap requires the court to decide which of two
presumptions is applicable. The first presumption is the presumption in favor
of arbitration, and it applies to all questions concerning the scope of a valid
arbitration agreement. 185 Additionally, the presumption of arbitration also
applies to gateway procedural issues that "grow out of the dispute and bear on
its final disposition." 186 Gateway procedural questions involve prerequisites,
or conditions precedent, to arbitration like notice, waiver, and estoppel. 187 If
the controversy turns on the resolution of one of these issues, then the
presumption of arbitrability also applies. 188
The application of the presumption of arbitrability to procedural matters is
based on the expectation of the parties. 189 This expectation is gleaned from
183. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 539 U.S. at 452.
184. Id. at 453.
185. Id. at 452.
186. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 376 U.S. at 557.
187. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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the existence of the valid arbitration agreement. The valid arbitration
agreement evidences the parties' intent to arbitrate their underlying disputes;
thus, they probably also expect an arbitrator, rather than a court, to resolve
mere procedural gateway questions. 190
However, there are limited circumstances in which the parties expect
courts, rather than arbitrators, to resolve their gateway disputes, even if they
consented to a broad arbitration agreement. 191 This expectation gives rise to
the pro-court presumption. Based on the plurality's decision in Green Tree
Financial Corp., the court must determine if one of two gateway arbitrability
questions exists before this presumption is triggered.' 92
The first of the two gateway arbitrability questions concerns the existence
of a valid arbitration agreement. 193 The second gateway arbitrability question
asks whether the arbitration agreement applies to a certain controversy. 194 If
the dispute involves one of these two questions, then the pro-court
presumption applies in the absence of clear and unmistakable evidence to the
contrary. 195  Courts should hesitate to interpret silence or ambiguity in
answering these two questions because such interpretation could result in
unwilling parties arbitrating matters that they never agreed to arbitrate. 196
VI. NATIONAL BASKETBALL AssN V. NATIONAL BASKETBALL PLAYERSASS'N
This section of the article will examine the District Court for the Southern
District of New York's decision in National Basketball Ass' v. National
Basketball Players Ass'n, which was the case that upheld the arbitrator's
reduction of Indiana Pacer Jermaine O'Neal's suspension. In doing so, close
attention will be paid to the district court's analysis to determine if it followed
the roadmap outlined by the Supreme Court in First Options, Howsam, and
Green Tree Financial Corp. for resolving arbitrability disputes.
The issue before the court was "whether the Grievance Arbitrator had
jurisdiction or authority to review an appeal of the suspensions imposed.., by
the NBA Commissioner."' 97 The court began its analysis by satisfying the
first step of the roadmap. Specifically, the court first looked to the arbitration
190. Id.
191. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 539 U.S. at 452.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. First Options, 514 U.S. at 949.
197. Nat'l Basketball Ass"n, 2005 WL 22869, at *4.
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clause contained in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the
NBA and the NBPA to see if the parties contractually answered the "who
decides arbitrability" question.198
The NBA argued that the CBA contained both a broadly worded
arbitration clause that committed all disputes to arbitration and a conflicting
specific clause that assigned certain matters to the commissioner. 199 Thus, the
NBA believed that these conflicting clauses created ambiguity as to whether
the parties agreed to arbitrate the issue of player suspensions.200 The court,
however, did not agree with the NBA's interpretation of the CBA.20 Not only
did the court fail to find any ambiguity in the contract but instead the court
borrowed language from First Options by finding "clear and unmistakable"
evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate the issue.
202
The court found this "clear and unmistakable" evidence in Section 1 (b) of
Article XXXI of the CBA, which provides that "[t]he Grievance Arbitrator
shall also have jurisdiction over disputes involving player discipline to the
extent set forth in Section 8 below . . . ."203 "Section 8 ... outlines the special
procedure[s] for appeals to the Commissioner. . . [for] player discipline [for
actions occurring] 'on the playing court.' ' 2 04 Additionally, the court looked to
Section 5(b), which provides
the Grievance Arbitrator [with the] jurisdiction and authority... to [1]
interpret, apply, or determine compliance with the provisions [of the
CBA]; [2] interpret, apply or determine compliance with the
provisions of Player Contracts; [3] determine the validity of Player
Contracts pursuant to Section 1 of... Article [XXXI.] 20 5
Further, Section 35(h) of the NBA Constitution, which is incorporated into
the Uniform Player Contract,
provides that [e]xcept for a penalty imposed under Paragraph (g) of
this Article 35 [relating to players gambling on the outcome of any
game],... [a]ny such challenge by a player [to the decisions and acts
of the Commissioner pursuant to Article 35] shall be resolved by the
Grievance Arbitrator in accordance with the grievance and arbitration
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at *5.
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procedures of the collective bargaining agreement.20 6
Thus, the court found that the CBA and the NBA Constitution both
contained proof that the parties agreed to arbitrate disciplinary decisions
rendered by the Commissioner.20 7 Therefore, the Grievance Arbitrator had the
authority to answer the "who decides arbitrability" question by determining
his own jurisdiction.20 8
The court could have ended its discussion with the finding that the CBA
and the NBA Constitution both called for the arbitrator to decide the issue.20 9
Instead, the court went on to address the NBA's second argument that the
court should resolve the dispute because it involves a matter of substantive
arbitrability. 210 By analyzing this argument, the court effectively satisfied the
second step of the roadmap, deciding which presumption applies. 211
However, in conducting this second inquiry, the court did not use the exact
language utilized in First Options, Howsam, and Green Tree Financial Corp.
The court did not look at the facts to determine whether they involved gateway
arbitrability questions or gateway procedural questions.212 Rather, the court
analyzed the facts under the traditional concepts of substantive and procedural
arbitrability. 213
The NBA argued that the issue before the court involved a substantive
arbitrability question;214 specifically, whether appeals of disciplinary decisions
rendered and imposed by the Comissioner for conduct "on the playing court"
are arbitrable.215 Thus, if the NBA's contentions were correct, the pro-court
presumption would apply in the absence of clear and unmistakable evidence
that the parties agreed to arbitrate substantive arbitrability questions. 216 The
NBA, however, provided clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties did
not agree to arbitrate substantive issues. 217 This evidence came in the form of
Section 5(b) of Article XXXI of the CBA, which expressly states that the
Grievance Arbitrator does not have the authority to resolve questions of
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at *6-7.
214. Id. at *5.
215. Id. at *7.
216. Id.
217. Id. at *5.
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substantive arbitrability. 218
Before addressing the NBA's arguments, the court first directed its
attention to the grievance and arbitration procedures that were agreed upon by
the parties and outlined in the NBA Constitution and the CBA.2 19 Section
35(h) of the NBA Constitution discusses "misconduct" and states the general
rule that challenges by players for decisions given by the Commissioner "shall
be resolved by the Grievance Arbitrator in accordance with the grievance and
arbitration procedures of the [CBA]. ' 220 Turning next to the CBA, the court
found that Article XXXI of the CBA sets forth the general procedure players
must follow when challenging disciplinary decisions by the Commissioner. 221
However, the court recognized that Section 8 of Article XXXI contains
two exceptions to the general rule established by Section 35(h) of the NBA
Constitution. 222 Section 8, titled "Special Procedure with Respect to Player
Discipline," outlines the procedures for both the rendering and appealing of
disciplinary decisions based on conduct that (a) occurs "on the playing court,"
or (b) is harmful to the "preservation of the integrity of, or the maintenance of
public confidence in, the game of basketball. '223 Section 8 provides the
Commissioner with the power to discipline players for offenses that fall into
one of these two categories. 224 Section 8 also gives the Commissioner the
exclusive authority to hear appeals from such disciplinary decisions. 225
Accordingly, if the dispute involves an appeal of a disciplinary decision based
on a Section 8 offense, it is not arbitrable. 226
After reviewing the NBA's grievance procedures, the court was ready to
address the NBA's arguments that the arbitrability dispute was substantive
because it concerned the question of who has the authority to review
disciplinary decisions imposed for "on the court" offenses.227 First, the court
agreed with the NBA that if the issue involved substantive arbitrability, then
the court should decide the issue.228 The court also agreed with the NBA's
contention that appeals from disciplinary decisions by the Commissioner for
218. Id.
219. Id. at *4-5.
220. Id. at *5.
221. Id.
222. Id. at *5-6.
223. Id. at *6.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at *6.
227. Id. at *5.
228. Id.
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"on the court" activity are not arbitrable. 229 However, the court refused to
accept the NBA's characterization of the issue at bar.
230
Instead, the court found that the real issue concerned the process through
which an appeal must be sought; therefore, the case involved a question of
procedural arbitrability. 231 To the court, the issue was not a substantive "who
decides arbitrability" question, like what was presented in First Options, but
rather a question concerning a prerequisite to arbitration, like the issue
addressed in Howsam. The prerequisite to arbitration that needed resolution
concerned the applicable procedure for appealing the Commissioner's
decision. 232 The court recognized that "[d]isputes . . . [that] bring into
question the procedures to be followed by parties when instituting grievances,
are best left to the arbitrator" to decide.233 Further, the court quoted the
Supreme Court's finding in Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. that "[t]he ablest
judge cannot be expected to bring the same experience and competence to bear
upon the determination of a grievance, because he cannot be similarly
informed. 234
Finally, the court directed its attention to the NBA's challenge that the
Grievance Arbitrator did not have arbitrable jurisdiction over the claim
because it involved an appeal from discipline imposed for an "on the court"
offense. 235  The NBA argued that "'misconduct at or during a game'
constitutes 'conduct on the playing court' which is appealable solely to the
Commissioner" and not subject to arbitration.236 Conversely, the NBPA
argued that "conduct on the playing court" only applies to conduct that
''occurs as part of the playing of a game (such as flagrant fouls and fights
between players [or] confronting referees.. .).,237 However, both parties were
in agreement "that 'conduct on the playing court' [was] not limited [to] ... the
physical dimensions of the basketball court or the time limitations of a
professional game." 238 In support of their respective views, both sides asked
the court to review three things (a) the CBA, (b) Player Conduct Memos sent
229. Id. at *7.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. (citing Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 581-82).
235. Id. at *7.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
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to players, and (c) the NBA's history of past grievances. 239 The parties hoped
that these materials would help guide the court in its interpretation of
"conduct on the playing court."'240
A. The CBA
"The NBA argued that Article 35(d) provided support for [its contention
that] 'conduct on the playing court' is synonymous with any conduct at or
during an exhibition, regular season or playoff game." 24 1 The court, however,
was not persuaded. In fact, the court found that the NBA's position was
"inconsistent with the clear language of the NBA Constitution." 242 The NBA
was correct in that Article 35(d) of the NBA Constitution does allow for the
suspension of any player by the Commissioner for conduct "at or during an
Exhibition, Regular Season, or Playoff game," where the conduct by the
player is "prejudicial to or against the best interests of the [NBA] or the game
of basketball. '243 But the court found that Article 35(d) is qualified by Article
35(h), which states that the Grievance Arbitrator shall resolve any challenges
and acts of the Commissioner except for acts of wagering on games.244
Additionally, the court was unwilling to accept the NBA's broad
interpretation of Article 35(d) because, in the court's opinion, to do so would
expand the Commissioner's power to the point where players would be unable
to appeal any discipline imposed by the Commissioner to the Grievance
Arbitrator.245  The court stated that if the parties wanted to give the
Commissioner that much authority, then they would have used the same
explicit language in both Articles 35(d) and Section 8.246 Specifically, "[t]he
fact that Article 35(d) gives the Commissioner power [over] conduct 'at or
during' any game, while Section 8 limits his appe[llate] authority to 'conduct
on the playing court' [provided the court with the] indication that the parties
did not intend for these [two] sections to be synonymous. ... 247 Further, the
court recognized that the parties made reference to "on the court" and "off the
court" conduct in several different sections of the CBA, the Uniform Player
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at *8.
247. Id.
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Contract, and the NBA Constitution. 248  Thus, the parties had clearly
differentiated conduct "on the court" and conduct "off the court." Therefore,
the court found that "conduct on the playing court" is not synonymous with
conduct "at or during" any game.
249
B. Player Conduct Memos
"Every year since 1997, the NBA [has sent] each player [an] annual Player
Conduct Memo [that details] what the [NBA] considers regulated on the court
and off the court conduct. ' 250 Based on the October 18, 2004 Memo,
regulated on the court conduct includes (a) throwing a connecting or non-
connecting punch during a game, (b) other comparable methods for striking
another player, (c) leaving the bench in connection with an altercation during a
game, (d) leaving the bench in street clothes during a game, (e) committing a
flagrant foul,2 51 and (f) improper conduct toward officials.
252
The Memo contained additional rules relating to on the court conduct
concerning fan and player interaction. 253 These rules require that (a) "players
remain seated on the bench while the ball is in play," (b) "players conduct
themselves in an appropriate manner while sitting on the bench," (c) players
"refrain from unnecessarily blocking spectators' views," (d) players should not
stimulate or encourage crowd disorder, (e) "players refrain from profane or
objectionable language that may be heard by spectators or picked up by radio
and/or television microphones," and (f) players "refrain from making lewd and
objectionable gestures." 254 The Memo's section of "on the court" regulated
conduct concludes by requiring that players leave the court immediately after
games and go to their dressing rooms.255 Further, this last section provides
that if a player is ejected from a game, then that player must immediately go to
248. Id.
249. Id. at *9.
250. Id.
251. The rules on flagrant fouls describe a Flagrant "1" as "unnecessary contact committed by a
player against an opponent" and a Flagrant "2" as "unnecessary and excessive contact committed by a
player against an opponent." Id.
252. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 2005 WL 22869, at *9. The NBA provided examples of improper
conduct towards officials in its 2004 Player Conduct Memo. Such conduct included, but was not
limited to, physical conduct with an official (including using profanity), overt actions indicating
resentment to a foul call, harassing an official before, during, or after a game, entering the official's
dressing room at any time, or public criticism of an official. Id.
253. Id. at*10.
254. Id.
255. Id. at*10.
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the dressing room and remain there until the game is completed.256
The Memo also has a section that regulates violent conduct off of the
court. 257 This section provides that "[a]ny player who commits an act of
violent misconduct against other team employees or a member of the public
will be subject to discipline, including fines, suspensions, or termination of
employment. '258 Thus, based on these two sections, the court concluded that
the Memos supported the NBPA's position that by striking a fan, O'Neal's
conduct was regulated by the section concerning off the court conduct.259
In fact, the court found that "striking a fan has never been characterized as
conduct on the playing court. '260 This finding made sense to the court
because striking a fan has no place in the play of the game.2 6 1 The court
contrasted this act with violence that takes place on the court.2 62 Violence on
the court, while prohibited, is expected and anticipated to occasionally
occur.26 3  Conversely, the court found that violence committed against
spectators is "considered something different and much more serious." 264
To the court, the "dispute [was] not about the Commissioner's authority to
take strong and decisive action to discipline players who strike fans." 265 The
court stated that this authority was "unquestionable." 266 However, the dispute
did concern the appropriate measure for appealing the Commissioner's
decision.267 On this issue, the court found that the NBA's own Player
Conduct Memo supports its decision that O'Neal's actions were not subject to
Section 8's exception for conduct "on the playing court. ' 268
C. Past Grievances
The last basis for the NBA's contention that O'Neal's conduct should be
considered to have occurred "on the playing court" was based on the league's
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
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history of past grievances. 269 In making this argument, the NBA provided a
list of sanctions that it imposed against players for various offenses. 270 All of
these rulings were rendered by the Commissioner and were not subjected to
Grievance Arbitration. 271 However, not one of the provided offenses involved
a situation where a player struck a spectator.272 In fact, the court found that all
of the offenses listed by the NBA were clearly covered by the regulations for
conduct occurring on the court.273 Accordingly, the court was not persuaded
by the NBA's final argument.274
Based on all of its findings, the court ultimately concluded that the
Grievance Arbitrator was well within his authority to review his own
jurisdiction and resolve the question of arbitrability. 275 The court did note that
its holding did not touch the "merits of the Grievance Arbitrator's reduction of
O'Neal's suspension from [twenty-five] to [fifteen games.]" Instead, the court
limited its opinion to the arbitrability of the dispute.276
VII. ADDITIONAL CASES
The O'Neal suspension reduction is not the first instance where an
arbitrator has modified or overturned a NBA Commissioner's disciplinary
decision. Perhaps no other case best exemplifies the power arbitrators have
over the disciplinary decisions rendered by the NBA Commissioner than the
arbitrable award in the Latrell Sprewell case.277 In 1997, Sprewell attacked
his former coach, P.J. Carlesimo. 278 Sprewell attacked Carlesimo after being
kicked out of practice by the coach. 279 The attack consisted of Sprewell
wrapping his hands around Carlesimo's neck for almost ten seconds while
stating, "I will kill you."280 Sprewell then left the court only to reenter and
accost the coach again, this time throwing at least one punch that grazed
269. Id.
270. Id. at*1l.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. In re Nat'l Basketball Players Ass'n on behalf of Player Latrell Sprewell and Warriors
Basketball Club and Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 591 PLI/Pat (Pub. L. Inst.) 469 (2000) (Feerick, Arb.)
[hereinafter Warriors Basketball Club].
278. Id. at 546.
279. Id.
280. Id.
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Carlesimo's right check.281  As a result of this altercation, Sprewell was
suspended from NBA play by NBA Commissioner David Stem for one
year.282 Stern believed the suspension was necessary to preserve the integrity
of the game and justified the severity of the sanction by stating that failure to
impose such a penalty "would denigrate" the public's confidence in the
game.283 Sprewell's team, the Golden State Warriors, issued its own penalty
by terminating Sprewell's contract 284 based on provisions in the Uniform
Player Contract 285 and Sprewell's violation of the Warriors' Team Rules. 286
Sprewell and the NBPA appealed the suspension to a Grievance
Arbitrator. 287 After a nine-day hearing, the Grievance Arbitrator issued a
ruling that criticized Sprewell's actions but found that the Commissioner's
discipline was not fundamentally fair.288 Therefore, the Grievance Arbitrator
reduced Sprewell's suspension by limiting it to the 1997-98 season.289 Thus,
what was once a full year ban that would have carried over into the following
season was shrunk to approximately a seven-month ban consisting of sixty-
eight games. 29
0
The Grievance Arbitrator believed that "justice and fairness" called for a
ruling that would allow Sprewell to put the "tragic event behind him."' 29 1
Ironically, before issuing this ruling, the Grievance Arbitrator stated that "it
would be wrong for [him] to substitute [his] judgment for [the
Commissioner's] in terms of discipline." 292 However, that is exactly what the
Grievance Arbitrator did.
The Grievance Arbitrator also reinstated Sprewell's contract with the
Warriors based on a finding that the termination lacked cause. 293 Chief to the
Grievance Arbitrator's decision was the finding that "[t]here has never been a
281. Id. at 548-49.
282. Id. at 555.
283. Id. at 540.
284. Id. at 553.
285. Paragraph 16 of the Uniform Player Contract states that a team may terminate a player's
contract if the player fails, refuses, or neglects to conform his personal conduct to standards of good
citizenship, good moral character and good sportsmanship. Id. at 478-79.
286. Warrior Team Rules contained a provision on player violence that warns of "immediate and
appropriate action" against any player who engages in violent conduct. Id. at 479-80.
287. Id. at 473.
288. Id. at 473, 475.
289. Id. at 475.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 573.
292. Id. at 571.
293. Id. at 576.
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case of contract termination in the history of the NBA for . . . physical
assault. '2 94 Based on the Grievance Arbitrator's ruling, that fact continues to
hold true today.
However, the NBA Commissioner is not the only professional sports
commissioner in the United States to have a disciplinary decision overruled by
an arbitrator. On August 10, 2005, Major League Baseball (MLB)
Commissioner Bud Selig's suspension of Texas Ranger pitcher Kenny Rogers
was reduced from twenty to thirteen games. 295 Selig suspended Rogers for
accosting two cameramen before a game in Texas on June 29, 2005.296
During the confrontation, Rogers shoved both cameramen, sending one to the
hospital. 297
The arbitrator who heard the case upheld the Commissioner's imposition
of a $50,000 fine, but reduced the suspension on the basis that it "went too
far."' 298 Selig commented on the reduction in a released statement by saying
that "[i]t sends the wrong message to every one of our constituents: the fans,
the media, and our players." 299 Selig also stated that "[t]here is a standard of
behavior ... expected of our players, which was breached in this case. The
arbitrator's decision diminishes that standard ... ,,300
VIII. WHAT CAN BE DONE?
So what can the NBA and MLB Commissioners do to uphold standards
for their leagues by preventing their decisions from being overturned or
modified by arbitrators? Well, instead of vesting their respective Players
Unions with the option of arbitrating disciplinary decisions, they could have
followed the NFL's lead by expressly giving the commissioner sole authority
to impose penalties and hear appeals. 30 1 Thus, the NFL's Commissioner has
the power to sanction players without the fear of having a Grievance
Arbitrator reduce the sanction based on "fairness", or because it "went too
294. Id. at 570.
295. Kelsie Smith, Arbitrator Ends The Suspension of Rogers, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 10, 2005,
at C5.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. See THE NFL MGMT. COUNCIL & THE NFL PLAYERS ASS'N, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT art. XI (1998), http://www.nflpa.org/media/printerffiendly.asp?subpage =
CBA+Complete#intro.
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far."'30 2 By keeping the punitive process in-house, the NFL does not have to
worry about outsiders diminishing the standards of its game.
Unfortunately for the NBA and MLB, the odds are not too good in terms
of putting the arbitration genie back into the bottle. It is doubtful that the
Players Unions for these two leagues would be willing to give up arbitrable
review without a significant fight. After all, both unions view their
commissioners as extensions of management, and why should not they? For
both leagues, the commissioner represents management in the collective
bargaining process. 30 3 Thus, based on this apparent conflict of interest, it is
reasonable for the NBA and MLB Players Unions to question whether their
commissioners will be unbiased in ruling on disciplinary matters.
Unlike his counterparts in the NBA and MLB, the NFL Commissioner
does not represent management in labor negations.30 4 Instead, the NFL has a
National Football League Management Council that acts as the exclusive
bargaining representative for its member clubs. 30 5 Thus, there is no prima
facie conflict of interest. Accordingly, it is more understandable why the
National Football League Players Association (NFLPA) would be willing to
allow the NFL Commissioner to retain complete power over disciplinary
decisions.
On July 22, 2005, the fourth major professional sport league in the United
States, the National Hockey League (NHL), announced the ratification of a
CBA. 306 The completion of the CBA was cause for celebration for both NHL
management and the National Hockey League Players Association (NHLPA)
because it ended a lockout that canceled the entire 2004-5 season.30 7 A close
look at the new CBA reveals that the NHL Commissioner, Gary Bettman, has
exclusive power to issue fines up to $1,000 and suspend players for any
offensive conduct that occurs "on the ice." 308 Initially, it appears that the
NHL Commissioner has a significant amount of disciplinary authority.
However, the "on the ice" qualification might be analogous to the "on the
playing court" qualification in Section 8 of the NBA's CBA. It remains to be
seen just how analogous the two clauses are. Although, it seems possible that
302. Smith, supra note 295.
303. Jason M. Pollack, Note, Take My Arbitrator, Please: Commissioner "Best Interests"
Disciplinary Authority In Professional Sports, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1645, 1711 (1999).
304. Id. at 1711.
305. Id.
306. Board of Governors Ratifies Collective Bargaining Agreement, NHL.COM, July 22, 2005,
http://www.nhl.com/nhlhq/cba/cba-ratified072205.html.
307. See id.
308. NAT'L HOCKEY LEAGUE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. 18 (1997),
http://www.nhlpa.com/CBA/PDF/CBA-1997.pdf.
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an arbitrator could apply the requirement the same way the Grievance
Arbitrator did in the case concerning O'Neal's suspension.
Thus, the question remains open as to how the NBA, MLB, and perhaps
even the NHL, can keep disciplinary matters out of arbitration. Based on the
aforementioned cases, there appears to be a willingness on the part of
arbitrators to rule in favor of arbitrability. Critics of the system might argue
that the basis for this willingness may lie in the fact that arbitrators are not
paid unless the case is actually arbitrated.
If the leagues are concerned about having an arbitrator determine his or
her own jurisdiction, then they may want to change the arbitration agreements
found in their respective CBAs to call for judicial determination for both
substantive and procedural gateway questions. Remember, the presumptions
provided by First Options, Howsam, and Green Tree Financial Corp. are
default rules and as such can be modified by express agreement of the parties.
Further, the first step of the Supreme Court's arbitrability roadmap calls courts
to determine if the parties have expressly answered the "who decides
arbitrability" question. Thus, if the court determines that the parties have
called for judicial determination of all arbitrability questions, then it will hear
the case and resolve the dispute.
Although, absent such express agreement, courts have favored a finding of
arbitrability when the arbitration clause at issue is contained in a CBA.3 °9
Additionally, the district court's opinion in National Basketball Ass 'n serves
as an example of at least one court's willingness to rule in favor of arbitrability
for matters involving disciplinary decisions rendered by commissioners of
professional sport leagues. That case, however, is only a district court
decision and as such is not controlling authority in any jurisdiction.
Accordingly, it will be interesting to see how appellate courts and courts
of last resort decide similar cases in the future, especially in light of the
Supreme Court's decisions in First Options, Howsam, and Green Tree
Financial Corp.. Until then, National Basketball Ass 'n serves as guidance as
to how courts may resolve said cases. While the district court in National
Basketball Ass 'n did not use the exact language utilized by the Supreme Court
in First Options, Howsam, and Green Tree Financial Corp., the court
effectively followed the Supreme Court's roadmap for resolving arbitrable
disputes. Therefore, it is possible that other courts may also find in favor of
arbitrability in similar cases.
309. Reuben, supra note 26, at 861.
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IX. CONCLUSION
Odds are that National Basketball Ass "n will not be the last case to decide
whether a disciplinary decision rendered by a parallel sports league is
arbitrable. After all, such disputes involve power struggles between
commissioners, Players Unions, and arbitrators. Commissioners do not want to
yield their power to discipline players and uphold expected standards of
behavior for their respective leagues. Yet, the Players Unions do not want to
give up their rights under their CBA and their individual performance
contracts. Finally, arbitrators do not appear to be willing to give up the power
given to them by the arbitration agreement in the CBA. Thus, it all comes
down to power. Ultimately, that is what arbitrability is about.

